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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade, the anti-corruption, ethics, and compliance landscape 
has changed dramatically. This is a direct consequence of a global anti- 
corruption enforcement effort led by the United States through its enforcement 
*Jessica Tillipman is the Assistant Dean for Field Placement and a Professorial Lecturer in 
Law at The George Washington University Law School, where she co-teaches an anti-corruption 
and compliance seminar. Vijaya Surampudi is an associate at Holland & Knight, LLP, in 
Washington, D.C. The authors would like to thank Joseph Toth, at second-year law student at 
The George Washington University Law School, for his excellent assistance with this article. An 
earlier version of this article was presented at the conference “Ethical Dilemmas in the Global 
Defense Industry,” Center for Ethics and the Rule of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law 
School (Apr. 16, 2015).
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of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.1 The increase in enforcement has also 
been spurred by the adoption of several multilateral anti-corruption agree-
ments, such as the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment (OECD) Anti-Bribery Convention and the United Nations Convention 
Against Corruption (UNCAC).2 These agreements have spurred several 
countries to enact anti-corruption laws, such as the U.K. Bribery Act, Brazil’s 
Clean Company Act, and France’s Loi Sapin II.3 The laws prohibit, among 
other things, the bribery of foreign government officials.4 They also encour-
age companies to dedicate resources to developing anti-corruption compli-
ance programs and maintaining robust internal controls.5 
The increase in anti-corruption enforcement has profoundly impacted 
large, multinational corporations. Many of these companies have responded 
to the enforcement increase by investing heavily in sophisticated compliance 
programs designed to prevent or mitigate liability for anti-corruption viola-
tions.6 The development of rigorous internal compliance programs has been 
particularly pronounced in the defense industry, especially among large, U.S. 
defense contractors.7
Unlike their large counterparts, many small government contractors are 
largely unable to keep up with the rapidly evolving trends and best practices 
in ethics and compliance. Their inattention to this critical area leaves them at 
1. See Rachel Brewster & Samuel W. Buell, The Market for Global Anticorruption Enforcement, 
80 L. & Contemp. Probs. 193, 193 (2017). 
2. See id. at 200; see also Elizabeth K. Spahn, Implementing Global Anti-Bribery Norms: From the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention to the U.N. Convention Against 
Corruption, 23 Ind. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 1, 1, 31 (2013). 
3. See Brewster & Buell, supra note 1, at 212–13; see also Pamela Davis & Lily Becker, Orrick, 
Herrington, & Sutcliffe, The Ever-Changing Compliance Landscape: What Is the Next 
Wave? 13 (2016). 
4. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a) (2012); Decreto No. 12.846, de 1 
de Agosto de 2013, Diário Oficial da União [D.O.U.] de 1.8.2013, art. 5 (Braz.); Loi 2016-1691 
du 9 décembre 2016 relative à la transparence, à la lutte contre la corruption et à la modernisation 
de la vie économique [Law 2016-1691 of December 9, 2016 Relating to the Transparency, the 
Fight Against the Corruption and the Modernization of the Economic Life], Journal Officiel 
de la République Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Dec. 10, 2016, No. 0287 
art. 3 (Fr.); Bribery Act 2010, c. 23, § 6 (UK); United Nations Convention Against Corruption 
art. 16, Oct. 31, 2003, 2349 U.N.T.S. 41 [hereinafter U.N. Convention Against Corruption]; 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Convention on Combating Bribery 
of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions art. 1.1, Dec. 17, 1997, 2802 
U.N.T.S. 225 [hereinafter OECD Convention]. 
5. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2); Decreto No. 12.846, de 1 de Agosto de 2013, arts. 6–7; Loi 
2016-1691 du 9 décembre 2016, art. 17; Bribery Act 2010 §§ 7, 9; U.N. Convention Against 
Corruption, supra note 4, art. 12; OECD Convention, supra note 4, art. 8. 
6. See Fritz Heimann, et al., Transparency International, Verification of Anti- 
Corruption Compliance Programs 5 (2014). 
7. See, e.g., Anti-Corruption Compliance, Northrop Grumman, https://www.northrop 
grumman.com/CorporateResponsibility/Pages/AntiCorruptionProgram.aspx [https://perma.cc 
/4HTM-4D48] (last visited Nov. 11, 2019); Ethics and Compliance, Boeing, https://www.boeing 
.com/principles/ethics-and-compliance.page [https://perma.cc/6GTX-3QGD] (last visited Nov. 
11, 2019). 
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risk for compliance failures, fraud, and corruption.8 As a result, small contrac-
tors are more likely than their large counterparts to be debarred from the U.S. 
procurement system.9 Despite the harsh consequences of compliance defi-
ciencies, few small contractors are likely to dedicate resources to the develop-
ment of vital compliance policies and internal controls because of the reality 
of limited resources.10 This has created a critical gap in the defense industry 
supply chain, as many large contractors may partner with small companies 
that lack the sophistication and resources necessary to ensure compliance with 
the many government contracts compliance requirements.11 
One solution to this growing problem is to incentivize large government 
contractors to help their small subcontractors develop compliance programs. 
The incentives, of course, must be substantial enough to convince large con-
tractors to share their confidential and proprietary compliance programs and 
best practices. 
Fortunately, a model for this type of arrangement exists in the U.S. pro-
curement system. The “mentor-protégé” program is designed to help small 
businesses navigate the immense government contracts regulatory system.12 
Under this program, generally a larger, more experienced contractor serves 
as a “mentor” to a smaller contractor (the “protégé”).13 The mentor, among 
other things, guides the protégé through the complex procurement regime by 
sharing expertise and resources.14 In return, the mentor is provided with con-
tractual opportunities and incentives by the U.S. Government.15 This model 
could benefit companies in the compliance space by providing a mechanism 
for contracting parties to exchange information and ensure transparency 
throughout all levels of the procurement process. 
This article recommends incentivizing large businesses to utilize their vast 
resources to assist their small business partners with the development of inter-
nal ethics and compliance programs in order to improve the overall integrity of 
the government procurement system. Part II of this article analyzes the devel-
opment of global anti-corruption compliance standards through an overview 
of noteworthy changes in laws, regulations and enforcement. Part III analyzes 
the current compliance risks that large companies face when contracting with 
 8. See Peter Jeydel, Yoking the Bull: How to Make the FCPA Work for U.S. Business, 43 Geo. J. 
Int’l L. 523, 531–32 (2012).
 9. See Jessica Tillipman, A House of Cards Falls: Why “Too Big to Debar” is All Slogan and Little 
Substance, 80 Fordham L. Rev. Res Gestae 49, 56 (2011) [hereinafter A House of Cards Falls]. 
10. See Ryan Bolger, Small Companies Face Tougher FCPA Scrutiny, Int’l Fin. L. Rev., Nov. 
2011, at 1. 
11. Cf. Howard Weissman, Changes in Defense Industry Are Increasing FCPA Risks, Law 360 
(Dec. 18, 2014), https://www-law360-com.gwlaw.idm.oclc.org/articles/602964?scroll=1&related=1 
[https://perma.cc/KZ4W-PZZV] (discussing the potential compliance risks of working with out-
side businesses). 
12. See Matthew Schoonover, 5 Things You Should Know: All Small Mentor-Protege Program, 
SmallGovCon (Sept. 20, 2017), http://smallgovcon.com/five-things/asmpp [https://perma.cc 
/7VB5-XX2F] (discussing the 2016 SBA All Small Mentor-Protégé Program). 
13. See id. 
14. See id. 
15. See id. 
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smaller companies who lack robust compliance systems and internal controls. 
Part IV recommends the adoption of a corporate mentor-protégé program 
that incentivizes larger companies to dedicate resources to helping smaller 
contractors develop anti-corruption compliance programs. Part V offers some 
concluding thoughts. 
II. GLOBAL SHIFT IN ANTI-CORRUPTION 
ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE
Over the past decade, there has been a global shift in perceptions and approaches 
towards public corruption. Enforcement has increased dramatically, the shar-
ing of information and resources among governments has improved, and 
global best practices in corporate anti-corruption compliance have continued 
to evolve. In response, dozens of countries have made multilateral commit-
ments to combat corruption and have enacted anti-corruption legislation to 
fight bribery and foster a new era of corporate anti-corruption compliance.16 
Anti-bribery enforcement agencies, non-governmental organizations, and 
civil society organizations have developed compliance guidance to assist com-
panies with the prevention and deterrence of corruption.17 In addition, large, 
multinational companies are now incentivized to invest in ethics and compli-
ance programs to avoid expensive anti-corruption enforcement actions and 
long-term reputational harm that may result from public knowledge of their 
misconduct.18 
16. See Decreto No. 12.846, de 1 de Agosto de 2013, Diário Oficial da União [D.O.U.] de 
7.8.2013 art. 5–7 (Braz.); Loi 2016-1691 du 9 décembre 2016 relative à la transparence, à la lutte 
contre la corruption et à la modernisation de la vie économique [Law 2016-1691 of December 9, 
2016 Relating to the Transparency, the Fight Against the Corruption and the Modernization of 
the Economic Life], Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of 
France], Dec. 10, 2016, No. 0287, art. 3, 17 (Fr.); Bribery Act 2010, c. 23, §§ 6–7, 9 (UK); U.N. 
Convention Against Corruption, supra note 4, arts. 12, 16; OECD Convention, supra note 4, arts. 
1, 8 (detailing the anti-bribery commitments member states pledge to make). 
17. See, e.g., Criminal Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Enf’t Div., U.S. Secs. & Exch. Comm’n, 
A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (2012) [hereinafter DOJ 
FCPA Guidance] (describing the general purpose of the guide); Org. for Econ. Co-operation 
and Dev. [OECD], Good Practice Guidance on Internal Controls, Ethics, and Compliance 2 
(Feb. 18, 2010), https://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/44884389.pdf [https://perma.cc/5TU4 
-AFSL] [hereinafter OECD Good Practice Guidance]; U.K. Ministry of Justice, he  Brib-
ery  Act  2010:  Guidance About Procedures Which Relevant Commercial Organisations 
Can Put Into Place to Prevent Persons Associated with Them from Bribing 6 (2011) [here-
inafter U.K. Bribery Act Guidance]; U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, Technical Guide to 
the United Nations Convention Against Corruption 56–60 (July 2009), https://www.unodc.org 
/documents/treaties/UNCAC/Publications/TechnicalGuide/09-84395_Ebook.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/XZH8-QGBB] (providing guidance to state parties implementing anti-corruption measures).
18. See Richard L. Cassin, With MTS in the New Top Ten, Just One U.S. Company Remains, 
FCPA Blog (Mar. 11, 2019), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2019/3/11/with-mts-in-the-new 
-top-ten-just-one-us-company-remains.html [https://perma.cc/XT8K-2QW9] (detailing enor-
mous fines paid by corporations for Foreign Corrupt Practices Act violations). 
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A. Relevant Anti-Corruption Laws, Treaties, and Conventions
Enacted in 1977, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA)19 has provided 
the foundation for today’s global anti-corruption enforcement activities.20 
The U.S. statute has two pillars: it criminalizes the bribery of foreign gov-
ernment officials, and it requires persons and entities to maintain accurate 
books and records and robust internal controls.21 Working in tandem, these 
two pillars not only combat bribery, but also ensure that companies and indi-
viduals do not hide bribes and improper transactions in off-book accounts 
and slush funds.22 FCPA enforcement has increased dramatically over the past 
decade and a half, resulting in hundreds of enforcement actions—a significant 
increase from previous decades of enforcement.23
The FCPA is famous for its broad jurisdiction—often ensnaring both 
U.S. and foreign companies that run afoul of its prohibitions—and its broad 
knowledge standard, which has resulted in significant fines and penalties for 
companies that rely on third parties to help them develop business opportu-
nities abroad.24 “The statute’s knowledge standard . . . is designed to ensure 
that companies do not hide behind their agents or other third parties to avoid 
liability for the bribery of foreign government officials.”25 “Indeed, the vast 
majority of FCPA cases have been [triggered by] third parties bribing gov-
ernment officials on behalf of a particular company.”26 “To reduce the risk 
of liability that may result from the actions” of third parties, companies have 
developed “robust due diligence and oversight procedures for the selection 
and monitoring of their third” parties.27 Companies that ignore bribery “red 
flags”28 in the vetting or monitoring of third parties proceed at their own peril.
Although the United States remained alone for twenty-five years in its fight 
against the bribery of government officials in international business transac-
tions, the anti-corruption landscape began to change in the late 1990s.29 
19. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-3, 78ff, 78m (2012). 
20. Cf. Susan Rose-Ackerman, International Anti-Corruption Policies and the U.S. National Inter-
est, 107 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. 252, 252–53 (2013) (“The United States remains the dominant 
actor in global international trade and can help to establish an international marketplace with 
strong standards against corruption [via the FCPA].”).
21. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a), 78m(b)(2). 
22. See DOJ FCPA Guidance, supra note 17, at 10, 39; see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a), 78m(b)(2). 
23. See FCPA Enforcement Trends, Ctr. for Responsible Enterprise & Trade (Apr. 26, 2017), 
https://create.org/news/fcpa-enforcement-trends [https://perma.cc/9PYE-LUYN]. 
24. See Kristen Savelle, The FCPA’s (Narrowing?) Extraterritorial Reach: Implications of United 
States v. Hoskins, China L. Connect, Dec. 2018, at 1–2 (discussing Chinese companies caught in 
the FCPA’s web); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(f)(2) (providing the statute’s knowledge standard).
25. Jessica Tillipman, Gifts, Hospitality & the Government Contractor, Briefing Papers, June 
2014, at 15 [hereinafter Gifts, Hospitality & the Government Contractor].
26. Id. 
27. Id.
28. See TRACE Int’l, TRACE Due Diligence Guidebook: Doing Business with Inter-
mediaries Internationally 19 (2010) (containing a list of common instances of potential bribery 
that should signal the need for caution and additional investigation).
29. See Lucinda A. Low, The United Nations Convention Against Corruption: The Globalization 
of Anticorruption Standards, Steptoe & Johnson LLP (May 4, 2006), www.steptoe.com/assets 
/attachments/2599.pdf [https://perma.cc/KA3L-8CJV].
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In less than a decade, dozens of countries [had] signed on to treaties requiring them 
to criminalize transnational bribery of foreign officials in similar terms to the anti-
bribery prohibition of the FCPA, requiring criminalization of money laundering 
where the predicate offense is a corrupt practice, and requiring cooperation with 
other counties in investigations and enforcement.30 
Moreover, multilateral agreements, such as the OECD Anti-Bribery Con-
vention and the UNCAC, have spawned implementing legislation across 
the globe designed to, among other things, combat bribery in international 
business.31 
Signed in 1997, the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention is aimed at reducing 
corruption in developing countries by encouraging sanctions against brib-
ery in international business transactions.32 The Convention largely mirrors 
the provisions of the FCPA, prohibiting the bribery of foreign government 
officials and requiring companies to maintain stringent internal controls.33 
30. Id. (detailing the numerous regional anti-corruption treaties that were also passed during 
this time period).
31. The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention spawned implementing legislation across the 
globe, including in Australia, Japan, Peru, and South Africa. See Org. for Econ. Co-operation 
and Dev. [OECD], Australia: Review of Implementation of the Convention and 1997 Rec-
ommendation 1, http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/anti-briberyconvention/2378916.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7U6V-ZU8F] (last visited Nov. 11, 2019) (providing an overview of Austra-
lia’s implementing legislation); Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev. [OECD], Japan: Review 
of Implementation of The Convention and 1997 Recommendation 1 (May 21, 2002), http://
www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/anti-briberyconvention/2387870.pdf [https://perma.cc/FD5X 
-FFKS] (providing an overview of Japan’s implementing legislation); Org. for Econ. Co-operation 
and Dev. [OECD], Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention: Phase 1 Report 4 (Mar. 
6, 2019), http://www.oecd.org/corruption/anti-bribery/OECD-Phase-1-Report-Peru-ENG.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/MPT6-A2MV] (providing an overview of Peru’s implementing legislation); 
Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev. [OECD], South Africa: Phase 1: Review of Implemen-
tation of the Convention and 1997 Revised Recommendation 2, 8 (June 20, 2008), http://www 
.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/anti-briberyconvention/40883135.pdf [https://perma.cc/PS6E-DGAN] 
(providing an overview of South Africa’s implementing legislation). The UNCAC spawned 
implementing legislation across the globe, including in Ethiopia, Finland, Guatemala, and 
the United Kingdom. See U.N. Secretariat, Conference of the States Parties to the United 
Nations Convention Against Corruption: Executive Summary 2–3, U.N. Doc. CAC/COSP/
IRG/I/4/1Add.21 (Sept. 16, 2015), https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/Work-
ingGroups/ImplementationReviewGroup/ExecutiveSummaries/V1506566e.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/U468-FK8N] (providing an overview of Ethiopia’s implementing legislation); U.N. Office 
on Drugs and Crime, Mechanism for the Review of Implementation of the United Nations 
Convention Against Corruption: Response of Finland to the Comprehensive Self-Assessment 
Checklist 2–3 (Oct. 1, 2010), https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/SA-Report 
/Self-Assessment_Report_-_UNCAC_-_Finland.pdf [https://perma.cc/KQ95-Q4SG] (provid-
ing an overview of Finland’s implementing legislation); U.N. Secretariat, Conference of the States 
Parties to the United Nations Convention Against Corruption: Executive Summary 2, U.N. Doc. 
CAC/COSP/IRG/I/4/1/Add.33 (Nov. 19, 2015), https://undocs.org/en/CAC/COSP/IRG/I/4/1 
/Add.33 [https://perma.cc/NQ7H-C9F9] (providing an overview of Guatemala’s implement-
ing legislation); U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, United Nations Convention Against Cor-
ruption: UK Second Cycle Review-20180108-134632, at 20 (Nov. 24, 2017), https://www.unodc 
.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/SA-Report/2018_01_09_UK_SACL.pdf [https://perma.cc/5P 
TW-JL58] (providing an overview of the U.K.’s existing and implementing legislation). 
32. See OECD Convention, supra note 4, pmbl., art. 3. 
33. Compare id., arts. 1, 8, with Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a), 
78m(b)(2) (2012). 
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Thirty-six OECD member countries and eight non-member countries have 
adopted the Convention.34 
The OECD Working Group on Bribery monitors the implementation 
of anti-corruption legislation and assesses anti-corruption law enforce-
ment efforts.35 Over the past decade, active implementation of the OECD 
Anti-Bribery Convention has led to the criminal sanctioning of 560 individu-
als and 184 entities for foreign bribery. 36 
The UNCAC requires signatory states to implement a variety of anti-cor-
ruption measures, which affect their laws, institutions, and practices.37 As 
of June 26, 2018, there are 186 parties to the Convention.38 The UNCAC 
provides a holistic approach to combatting corruption, focusing not only on 
traditional law enforcement techniques, but also on methods of enhancing 
international co-operation and preventative measures directed at both the 
public and private sectors.39 Similar to the OECD Anti-Bribery Conven-
tion, the UNCAC requires states to impose “civil, administrative or crimi-
nal penalties” on individuals or companies that engage in acts of corruption 
to dissuade other entities from propelling or encouraging similar patterns of 
corruption.40 Through its “Conference of the States Parties,” the UNCAC 
provides a mechanism designed to encourage cooperation among state parties 
and to promote the Convention’s implementation.41 Its provisions also address 
the “promotion of corporate codes of conduct, best practices, and compliance 
programs for business and the professions, [and] measures to promote corpo-
rate transparency.”42 
In recent years, numerous countries have implemented these multilateral 
agreements by enacting robust anti-corruption laws. These laws, such as the 
U.K. Bribery Act, Brazil’s Clean Company Act, and France’s Sapin II, not 
only prohibit bribery, but also reinforce the importance of anti-corruption 
compliance programs.43 As these countries (and others) ramp up the enforce-
34. See OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in Interna-
tional Business Transactions, Org. for Econ. Cooperation & Dev., www.oecd.org/corruption 
/oecdantibriberyconvention.htm [https://perma.cc/Z98T-UMXD] (last visited July 14, 2019).
35. See id. 
36. See Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev. Working Grp. on Bribery [OECD], 2017 
Enforcement of the Anti-Bribery Convention 3 (Nov. 2018), https://www.oecd.org/daf/anti 
-bribery/OECD-WGB-Enforcement-Data-2018-ENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q5Q7-T7KQ]. 
37. See U.N. Convention Against Corruption, supra note 4, arts. 1, 16 (stating the purpose 
of the Convention and providing an example of anti-corruption measures signatory states are 
obliged to take).
38. See U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, Signature and Ratification Status (June 26, 2018), 
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatories.html [https://perma.cc/48ZJ-ZPEL].
39. See U.N. Convention Against Corruption, supra note 4, arts. 5, 7, 12, 46.
40. See id., art. 12.
41. See U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, Conference of the States Parties to the United 
Nations Convention Against Corruption, https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/CAC 
-COSP.html [https://perma.cc/LW36-3RAZ] (last visited Oct. 30, 2019). 
42. Low, supra note 29, at 6. 
43. See Decreto No. 12.846, de 1 de Agosto de 2013, Diário Oficial da União [D.O.U.] de 
1.8.2013 arts. 5–7 (Braz.); Loi 2016-1691 du 9 décembre 2016 relative à la transparence, à la lutte 
contre la corruption et à la modernisation de la vie économique [Law 2016-1691 of December 9, 
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ment of their new laws, companies will face greater pressure to ensure their 
anti-corruption compliance programs meet the emerging global compliance 
standards. 
B. Robust Anti-Corruption Enforcement Ushers in a New Era of Compliance
The dramatic increase in anti-corruption enforcement by the United States 
and (increasingly) other countries demonstrates a growing global commit-
ment to combatting corruption. Many household company names have run 
afoul of the FCPA, resulting in time-consuming, expensive, and embarrassing 
enforcement actions.44 For example, in 2019, Walmart, Inc. (Walmart) agreed 
to pay a combined total of $282.7 million to resolve a years-long investiga-
tion into the retail giant’s FCPA violations for failing, despite numerous red 
flags, to ensure sufficient global anti-corruption internal controls.45 Not only 
was Walmart required to pay both approximately $138 million in criminal 
penalties and approximately $144.7 million in civil penalties, it was com-
pelled to hire an independent compliance monitor to assist the company for 
an additional two years.46 Not surprisingly, the negative consequences stem-
ming from similar enforcement actions have incentivized large, multinational 
companies to invest in compliance programs that will detect, prevent, and 
deter illicit activities.47 Moreover, governments, international organizations, 
and civil society have also championed the role of ethics and compliance in 
helping to prevent and mitigate corporate corruption.48 
In fact, the U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ) has publicly recognized and 
rewarded companies that implement robust compliance programs even where 
2016 Relating to the Transparency, the Fight Against the Corruption and the Modernization of 
the Economic Life], Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of 
France], Dec. 10, 2016, No. 0287, arts. 3, 17 (Fr.); Bribery Act 2010, c. 23, §§ 6–7, 9 (UK). 
44. Cf. Richard L. Cassin, With Alstom, Three French Companies Are Now in the FCPA Top Ten, 
FCPA Blog (Dec. 23, 2014), www.fcpablog.com/blog/2014/12/23/with-alstom-three-french 
-companies-are-now-in-the-fcpa-top-t.html [https://perma.cc/LSH4-HC8Z] (establishing that 
many household companies settled FCPA violations with the DoJ, including Siemens ($800 mil-
lion in 2008), Alstom ($772 million in 2014), KBR/Halliburton ($579 million in 2009), and BAE 
($400 million in 2010)). 
45. See Letter from U.S. Dep’t of Justice Criminal Div. to Karen P. Hewitt, Jones Day (June 
20, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1175791/download [https://perma 
.cc/8ZCX-FPUX]); see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice Office of Pub. Affairs, Walmart 
and Brazil-Based Subsidiary Agree to Pay $137 Million to Resolve Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
Case (June 20, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/walmart-inc-and-brazil-based-subsidiary 
-agree-pay-137-million-resolve-foreign-corrupt [https://perma.cc/R7JM-DKQM].
46. See Letter to Karen P. Hewitt, supra note 45. 
47. See Heimann et al., supra note 6, at 5. 
48. See, e.g., DOJ FCPA Guidance, supra note 17, at 60 (providing an example of an gov-
ernmental organization that supports corporate ethics and compliance); OECD Good Practice 
Guidance, supra note 17, at 2; U.K. Bribery Act Guidance, supra note 17, at 20–31 (naming six 
key compliance principles to guide corporations); Peter Wilkinson, Transparency Interna-
tional UK, Global Anti-Bribery Guidance: Best Practice for Companies in The UK and 
Overseas 14 (2017); World Bank Grp. [WBG], Summary of World Bank Group Integrity Com-
pliance Guidelines 1–2 (Sept. 2010), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTDOII/Resources 
/IntegrityComplianceGuidelines_2_1_11web.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZC9E-28R5] [hereinafter 
World Bank Compliance Guidelines Summary]. 
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allegations of corruption arise. For example, in 2011, Johnson & Johnson 
(J&J) entered into a deferred prosecution agreement with the DoJ to resolve 
corruption allegations.49 The government made clear that it had reduced the 
company’s criminal penalty to $21.4 million and did not require it to retain 
a corporate monitor “[d]ue to J&J’s pre-existing compliance and ethics pro-
grams, extensive remediation and improvement of its compliance systems and 
internal controls. . . .”50 In 2012, the DoJ took the unprecedented step of pub-
licly announcing that it had declined to prosecute Morgan Stanley for the 
bribery of a Chinese government official because of the company’s strong, 
pre-existing compliance program.51 Instead, the DoJ limited its prosecution 
to the rogue employee who committed the wrongdoing.52
In addition, since 2017, the DoJ has included a formal “FCPA Corporate 
Enforcement Policy” in its Attorneys’ Manual,53 which considers, among other 
things, the “implementation of an effective compliance and ethics program” as 
a key criterion in determining whether a company may receive a reduced fine 
or penalty (or even declination) when settling an FCPA matter.54
Moreover, an international consensus has developed regarding best prac-
tices in corporate ethics and compliance programs.55 Several government 
enforcement agencies, non-governmental anti-corruption organizations, 
industry groups, and civil society organizations have released compliance 
“best practices” guides that provide proactive guidance to companies design-
ing risk-based, anti-corruption compliance programs.56 For example, in 2010, 
49. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice Office of Pub. Affairs, Johnson & Johnson Agrees 
to Pay $21.4 Million Criminal Penalty to Resolve Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and Oil for Food 
Investigations (Apr. 8, 2011), www.justice.gov/opa/pr/johnson-johnson-agrees-pay-214-million 
-criminal-penalty-resolve-foreign-corrupt-practices-act [https://perma.cc/CKD8-ETTB]. 
50. See id.
51. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice Office of Pub. Affairs, Former Morgan Stan-
ley Managing Director Pleads Guilty for Role in Evading Internal Controls Required by 
FCPA (Apr. 25, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-morgan-stanley-managing 
-director-pleads-guilty-role-evading-internal-controls-required [https://perma.cc/NK7C-NBZZ] 
(“After considering all the available facts and circumstances, including that Morgan Stanley con-
structed and maintained a system of internal controls, which provided reasonable assurances that 
its employees were not bribing government officials, the [DoJ] declined to bring any enforcement 
action. . . .”).
52. See id. Additionally, the DoJ’s public pronouncements regarding the importance of com-
pliance are not just limited to FCPA enforcement. See Brent Snyder, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., 
Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Remarks as Prepared for the International Chamber of Com-
merce/United States Council of International Business Joint Antitrust Compliance Workshop: 
Compliance Is a Culture, Not Just a Policy (Sept. 9, 2014) (extolling the importance of compli-
ance, calling it the “cornerstone of good corporate citizenship”). 
53. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice Office of Pub. Affairs, Deputy Attorney Gen-
eral Rosenstein Delivers Remarks at the 34th International Conference on the Foreign Cor-
rupt Practices Act (Nov. 29, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorney-general 
-rosenstein-delivers-remarks-34th-international-conference-foreign [https://perma.cc/6GBP 
-NNJD]. 
54. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Manual: Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 
§ 9-47.120 (2019). 
55. See infra text accompanying notes 41–45.
56. See, e.g., DOJ FCPA Guidance, supra note 17, at 63; OECD Good Practice Guidance, 
supra note 17, at 2; World Bank Compliance Guidelines Summary, supra note 48, at 2. 
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the OECD published a framework to help companies design their compliance 
programs entitled “Good Practice Guidance on Internal Controls, Ethics and 
Compliance.”57 In 2012, the DoJ published “A Resource Guide to the U.S. 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,” designed to outline both the government’s 
policies regarding FCPA enforcement and “the hallmarks of an effective cor-
porate compliance program.”58 In 2019, the DoJ updated its “Evaluation of 
Corporate Compliance Programs,” a formal resource exploring significant 
factors and questions used by prosecutors in evaluating the effectiveness of 
corporate compliance programs.59 Similarly, the United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime (UNODC), published “An Anti-Corruption Ethics and 
Compliance Programme for Business: A Practical Guide,” which outlines pre-
ventative measures to detect and deter foreign bribery during international 
business transactions.60 
In each guide, companies are encouraged to employ measures designed to 
prevent and detect misconduct.61 Although the recommendations are designed 
to be flexible and are tailored to each company’s particular risks and resources, 
they provide similar recommendations, applicable to all companies, regardless 
of size, industry, or risk.62 For example, most guides consider the following 
to be necessary components of an effective ethics and compliance program: 
(1) visible commitments from senior management; (2) a clear corporate policy 
prohibiting bribery and misconduct; (3) a code of conduct; (4) risk-tailored 
compliance policies and procedures; (5) risk assessments; (6) robust due dil-
igence and oversight of third parties; (7) confidential reporting and internal 
investigation procedures; (8) dedication of sufficient resources to the imple-
mentation and oversight of the compliance program; (9) ongoing training for 
employees and relevant third parties; (10) transparent financial and accounting 
procedures; (11) effective communication and documentation; (12) periodic 
review and testing of internal controls; and (13) incentives and disciplinary 
measures for violations of company policies and the law.63 
57. See OECD Good Practice Guidance, supra note 17, at 2.
58. See DOJ FCPA Guidance, supra note 17, at iv. 
59. See Criminal Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Pro-
grams Guidance Document 1 (2019) [hereinafter DOJ Evaluation of Corporate Compliance 
Programs]. Note that this guide was updated in 2019 to expand its application to the DoJ’s entire 
Criminal Division to better harmonize the guidance with other DoJ standards. See id. at 1–18.
60. See U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, An Anti-Corruption Ethics and Compliance Pro-
gramme for Business: A Practical Guide 8–9 (Sept. 2013), https://www.unodc.org/documents 
/corruption/Publications/2013/13-84498_Ebook.pdf [https://perma.cc/9X3A-4XA9] [hereinaf-
ter UNODC Practical Guide] (discussing the importance of combatting corruption and provid-
ing guidance on the processes of implementing a corporate compliance program).
61. See, e.g., DOJ FCPA Guidance, supra note 17, at 56; OECD Good Practice Guidance, 
supra note 17, at 2; World Bank Compliance Guidelines Summary, supra note 48, at 2. 
62. Compare Heimann et al., supra note 6, at 11–14 (naming effective leadership, resource 
management, reporting procedures, and monitoring as key compliance hallmarks), with DOJ 
FCPA Guidance, supra note 17, at 56–58 (naming management commitment, proper allocation 
of resources, and oversight as necessary elements of corporate compliance). 
63. See DOJ Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs, supra note 59, at 2–5, 6, 
10–12, 14–15; DOJ FCPA Guidance, supra note 17, at 57–62; Org. for Econ. Co-operation 
and Dev. et al. [OECD], Anti-Corruption Ethics and Compliance Handbook for Business, 16, 
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In light of the numerous compliance resources available to companies, 
“government regulators and enforcement agencies have little sympathy for 
companies that claim ignorance about the necessity of an effective compliance 
program.”64 For example:
They are equally harsh with companies that do compliance ‘on the cheap,’ such as 
downloading and adopting the policies and codes of conduct found on the internet, 
dedicating little to no resources to compliance activities, failing to provide ethics 
and compliance training to employees, or ignoring red flags of corruption or uneth-
ical behavior.65 
The DoJ’s own published guidance makes clear that there is little tolerance 
for companies that lack an effective program.66 Companies that fail to invest in 
compliance or merely maintain a “paper” compliance program will eventually 
violate a law—resulting in huge fines, penalties, investigative costs, reputa-
tional damage, and other related consequences.67 
C. Compliance Developments in the U.S. Government Procurement System
Although state-of-the-art compliance programs have grown recently in the 
commercial sector, as discussed above, robust compliance policies and pro-
cedures have always been critical for U.S. government contractors, given the 
myriad of laws regulating government procurement activities.68 Ensuring that 
compliance officers keep compliance programs consistent with regulations 
requires tracking and analyzing changes in regulations, which in turn requires 
significant technology and manpower.69 Compliance officers must be knowl-
edgeable and retain a skilled staff in order to maintain up-to-date policies and 
procedures.70 A contractor’s failure to comply with government requirements 
and obligations can devastate the company’s reputation and government 
18, 24, 28, 40, 47, 54, 61, 73, 98, 103, 111, 113, 117 (2013), https://www.oecd.org/corruption 
/AntiCorruptionEthicsComplianceHandbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/3N52-82NR] [hereinafter 
Anti-Corruption Ethics and Compliance Handbook for Business] (providing a compilation of 
international compliance rules); UNODC Practical Guide, supra note 60, at 14, 18–19, 21–22, 
33, 35, 63, 65, 81, 86. 
64. Gifts, Hospitality & the Government Contractor, supra note 25, at 20.
65. Id.
66. See Robert Tompkins & Rodney Perry, An Ethics and Compliance Punch List for Gov’t Con-
tractors, Law 360 (June 19, 2019), https://www.law360.com/articles/1170586/print?section=aero 
space [https://perma.cc/8DDA-CEGL]; see also DOJ Evaluation of Corporate Compliance 
Programs, supra note 59, at 1 (discussing potential prosecution or monetary penalties for non-
compliant companies). 
67. See DOJ Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs, supra note 59, at 1, 9; see also 
Tompkins & Perry, supra note 66. 
68. Cf. John D. Altenburg, Winding Down War Zone Contracts, Nat’l Def. Mag. (Nov. 1, 2013), 
www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2013/November/Pages/WindingDownWarZone 
Contracts.aspx [https://perma.cc/2C93-UZYJ] (discussing the importance of compliance pro-
grams for defense contractors operating in Afghanistan, given FAR requirements and legislative 
scrutiny).
69. See Stacey English & Susannah Hammond, Cost of Compliance 2015, at 8 (2015).
70. See id. at 3, 9, 15. 
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revenue streams.71 Not only does a contractor risk the termination of its cur-
rent contracts, it also faces a multitude of administrative remedies and civil or 
criminal penalties.72 Given the staggering consequences of non-compliance, it 
is no surprise that the United States’ largest contractors have invested heavily 
in developing robust and effective ethics and compliance programs.73 Indeed, 
some of the country’s largest contractors have been leaders in developing 
comprehensive and innovative anti-corruption policies and procedures.74 
In light of their significant compliance obligations, the comprehensive 
compliance guides are a significant resource for contractors designing, imple-
menting, and refining their internal compliance programs.75 They are of 
particular importance because most government contractors are legally obli-
gated to implement a “Contractor Code of Business Ethics and Conduct.”76 
This requirement is designed to ensure contractors “conduct themselves with 
the highest degree of integrity and honesty” and maintain a “written code 
of business ethics and conduct.”77 To promote compliance with these poli-
cies, the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) requires contractors to employ 
an “ethics and compliance training program and an internal control system” 
that: “(1) [is] suitable to the size of the company and extent of its involve-
ment in [g]overnment contracting; (2) [f]acilitate[s] timely discovery and dis-
closure of improper conduct in connection with [g]overnment contracts; and 
(3) [e]nsure[s] corrective measures are promptly instituted and carried out.”78
Implementing these “best practices” guidelines and ensuring a comprehen-
sive compliance and ethics program requires substantial integration through-
out all levels of a company. Large contractors often have a dedicated ethics and 
compliance staff that can oversee internal investigations and ensure that inter-
nal controls are functioning properly.79 Firms are under significant pressure 
to ensure that they dedicate ample resources and staffing to their compliance 
department or face tough questions from regulators.80 Further, companies must 
invest a significant number of hours providing ethics training to employees to 
71. See Fred Geldon, Special Compliance Requirements for Government Contractors, Corp. Com-
pliance Insights (Oct. 14, 2019), https://www.corporatecomplianceinsights.com/compliance 
-requirements-government-contractors [https://perma.cc/9Q9V-BMN6]. 
72. See FAR 9.406, 9.407 (describing suspension and debarment procedures for contractors); 
see also FCPA & Anti-Corruption Task Force, Morrison & Foerster LLP, The Foreign Cor-
rupt Practices Act and Global Anti-Corruption Law 61, 68, 71 (2010).
73. See Heimann et al., supra note 6, at 5. 
74. U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., GAO-09-591, Defense Contracting Integrity: 
Opportunities Exist to Improve DOD’s Oversight of Contractor Ethics Programs 8, 30 
(2009) (finding that fifty-five out of fifty-seven defense contractors that participated in a Gov-
ernment Accountability Office survey had FAR-compliant ethics programs, even prior to the 
promulgation of the FAR rules). 
75. See DOJ FCPA Guidance, supra note 17, at 57–58; OECD Good Practice Guidance, 
supra note 17, at 2; World Bank Compliance Guidelines Summary, supra note 48, at 2–3. 
76. See FAR 3.1000, 3.1002; see also FAR 52.203-13(b).
77. See FAR 3.1002(a)-(b). 
78. See FAR 3.1002(b). 
79. See John T. Jones & Greg Bingham, Costs of Mandatory Ethics and Compliance 
Programs 5–6 (2009). 
80. See English & Hammond, supra note 69, at 3–4, 15.
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ensure that all employees understand the company’s legal obligations, as well 
as its commitment to ethics and compliance. For example, a “typical aerospace 
and defense employee receives several hours of training each year on ethics 
and compliance with government contract requirements”—beyond what is 
typically required of government employees.81 The cost of training alone can 
easily result in any defense contractor spending “tens of millions of dollars 
annually” to ensure that all employees have a sufficient understanding of the 
interplay between government regulations and the daily operations of the 
business.82
Although many of the U.S. Government’s largest contractors have invested 
heavily in developing robust and sophisticated compliance programs, the 
smallest contractors lag far behind.83 Small businesses may be contractually 
required by FAR 52.203-13 to maintain a “code of business ethics and con-
duct” but are exempt from establishing a compliance program and an internal 
controls system.84 Although it is recommended that small businesses invest in 
these important compliance and internal control systems, the small business 
exemption is a recognition of the burden this requirement places on small 
businesses.85 Specifically, unlike larger companies, small businesses “lack the 
financial resources or the market power to enforce their zero tolerance pol-
icies” towards corruption.86 Small businesses have less capital and smaller 
profit margins to implement and maintain robust compliance programs and 
thus may feel more pressure to take shortcuts or engage in corrupt practices 
to obtain greater profit margins.87 Although the exemption of small businesses 
from a legally required compliance obligation is understandable (given the 
resources required to comply with this requirement), the exclusion continues 
to perpetuate weaknesses in the procurement system. 
Small businesses’ difficulty in complying with compliance regulations, and 
the effects of that difficulty, are well-documented. A 2012 report by UNODC 
found that the failure of small and medium-sized businesses (SMEs) to invest 
in ethics and compliance signals a significant failure in the system,88 and a 
81. See Jones & Bingham, supra note 79, at 6. 
82. See id.
83. See Kroll, 2014 Anti-Bribery and Corruption Benchmarking Report: Untangling 
the Web of Risk and Compliance 7 (2014) [hereinafter Kroll Anti-Bribery and Corruption 
Benchmarking Report].
84. See FAR 52.203-13(b)(2), 52.203-13(c). Should a business represent itself to be a small 
business concern pursuant to the solicitation, it is exempt from establishing a compliance and 
internal control system. See FAR 52.203-13(c); see also Joseph D. West et al., Contractor Business 
Ethics Compliance Program & Disclosure Requirements, Briefing Papers, Apr. 2009, at 4, 9. 
85. See Joseph D. West et al., supra note 84, at 6, 9. 
86. See U.N. Indus. Dev. Org. & U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, Corruption Prevention 
to Foster Small and Medium-Sized Enterprise Development: Volume II, at vii (2012), https://
www.unodc.org/documents/corruption/Publications/2012/Corruption_prevention_to_foster 
_small_and_medium_size_enterprise_development_Vol_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/2FTV-2URM] 
[hereinafter Corruption Prevention Report Vol. II].
87. See id. at 2.
88. Cf. id. at v, 35 (discussing how the current failings in global anti-corruption systems have 
especially negative consequences for SMEs). 
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2018 OECD report found that SMEs typically struggle more than large firms 
with handling many regulatory norms.89 In contrast to their larger coun-
terparts, SMEs have been much slower to implement or even acknowledge 
growing best practices in anti-corruption ethics and compliance programs.90 
The most common (and obvious) reason for the lack of SME commitment to 
compliance is cost.91 Most small businesses spend their resources just trying 
to survive and view compliance as a luxury—not as an essential aspect of doing 
business.92 In 2010, a report compiled for the Small Business Administration 
(SBA) reported that small firms with less than twenty employees paid $10,585 
per employee to comply with all federal regulations, while firms with between 
twenty and 499 employees paid $7,454 per employee.93 Given the high cost 
of compliance, many small businesses have found working outside regulatory 
requirements to be more profitable.94 Indeed, “corruption in business is an 
economic issue, and it will continue as long as the gains from corrupt [behav-
ior] exceed the expected losses that are, in turn, closely connected to the prob-
ability of being caught.”95
The failure of small companies to design and implement successful com-
pliance programs may also be attributed to the complexity of the current 
compliance guidelines.96 The “hallmarks of effective compliance programs” 
are often designed with large, multinational companies in mind.97 Although 
all the guides make clear that policies and procedures should be tailored to 
the risks and resources of each particular company, 98 the guidance can be 
overwhelming to resource-strapped SMEs. The guidance is also decidedly less 
89. See Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev. [OECD], Improving the Business Environ-
ment for SMEs Through Effective Regulation 3 (Feb. 22–23, 2018), https://www.oecd.org/cfe 
/smes/ministerial/documents/2018-SME-Ministerial-Conference-Parallel-Session-1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/YV4W-J6ME]. 
90. See Corruption Prevention Report Vol. II, supra note 86, at vii, 35, 57.
91. See id. at 4, 35. 
92. See generally Nicole V. Crain & W. Mark Crain, Small Bus. Admin. Office of Advocacy, 
The Impact of Regulatory Costs on Small Firms, at iv, 7 (2010) (discussing the high burden 
compliance costs place on small businesses, which might cause small businesses to forgo compli-
ance in lieu of day-to-day business costs). 
93. See id. at iv, 7, 55 (explaining the disproportionate cost of compliance for small businesses). 
94. See Vartuhí Tonoyan et al., Corruption and Entrepreneurship: How Formal and Informal Insti-
tutions Shape Small Firm Behavior in Transition and Mature Market Economies, Entrepreneurship 
Theory & Prac. 806 (Sept. 2010). 
95. U.N. Indus. Dev. Org. & U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, Corruption Prevention to 
Foster Small and Medium-Sized Enterprise Development: Volume I, 13 (2007), https://www 
.unodc.org/documents/corruption/Publications/2012/UNIDO-UNODC_Publication_on 
_Small_Business_Development_and_Corruption_Vol1.pdf [https://perma.cc/HKW6-PHQ3]. 
96. See Jane W. Moscowitz, Compliance Programs for Small Businesses, Prac. Law., July 2002, 
at 25. 
97. Cf. Anti-Corruption Ethics and Compliance Handbook for Business, supra note 63, at 17, 
22 (focusing its case studies on those involving multinational corporations); DOJ FCPA Guid-
ance, supra note 17, at 57 (recognizing that small-and-medium-size companies have different 
needs in terms of crafting compliance programs than large corporations); UNODC Practical 
Guide, supra note 60, at 21 (discussing compliance issues faced by senior management of large 
companies). 
98. See Anti-Corruption Ethics and Compliance Handbook for Business, supra note 63, at 
14; DOJ FCPA Guidance, supra note 17, at 56; UNODC Practical Guide, supra note 60, at 10.
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helpful to small businesses that lack the resources and sophistication neces-
sary to meet these aspirational standards.99 Many best practices are simply 
not feasible because the costs required to implement them are too high for 
resource-constrained entities.100 Regardless of the financial burden and infea-
sibility of implementing a robust compliance program, the legal risks remain 
the same. Thus, many small businesses face the same corruption and com-
pliance risks as their large counterparts, but do so without the same level of 
protection.
Although these compliance deficiencies of small businesses are bound to 
create problems, the failure of small businesses to invest in ethics and compli-
ance creates significant risks for large companies as well.101 A vast majority of 
large companies rely heavily on third parties or vendors to perform contracts, 
which in turn creates new oversight and monitoring obligations to ensure 
compliance with the law.102 This is particularly true in the defense industry, 
where large, multinational contractors depend on small businesses to perform 
contracts. Although large companies may value and invest in expensive com-
pliance programs, these efforts may be moot when a small company in their 
supply chain does not have the resources, knowledge, or even willingness to 
invest in compliance.103
III. THE RISKS OF CONTRACTING WITH SMALL BUSINESSES 
Although commercial companies may be inclined to avoid risky small busi-
nesses that do not invest in ethics and compliance, large government con-
tractors do not have the same luxury.104 The U.S. Government has injected 
socioeconomic policies into its procurement system to help develop small 
businesses;105 indeed, Congress has been clear it is the responsibility of the 
 99. See Kroll Anti-Bribery and Corruption Benchmarking Report, supra note 83, at 7, 
21.
100. Cf. Jones & Bingham, supra note 79, at 9 (finding that a robust compliance program, even 
for a small business, could amount to $2,000,000 per year to ensure satisfactory ethics, training 
and internal controls).
101. See Kroll & Ethisphere, Anti-Bribery & Corruption Benchmarking Report—2017: 
Beyond Regulatory Enforcement: The Rise of Reputational Risk 14, 17 (2017) [hereinafter 
Beyond Regulatory Enforcement] (discussing compliance risks associated with third parties, 
which are often smaller businesses). 
102. See Kroll, How Do Companies Navigate Bribery and Corruption?: 2015 Anti-Brib-
ery and Corruption Benchmarking Report 6 (2015) [hereinafter Kroll 2015 Anti-Bribery 
and Corruption Benchmarking Report]; see also Beyond Regulatory Enforcement, supra 
note 101, at 14, 17.
103. Cf. Beyond Regulatory Enforcement, supra note 101, at 5, 9, 14 (identifying third-
party compliance violations, which necessarily are not directly controlled by the large companies 
themselves, as a top anti-corruption concern). 
104. See infra text accompanying notes 89–100.
105. See Andrew George Sakallaris, Questioning the Sacred Cow: Reexamining the Justifications 
for Small Business Set Asides, 36 Pub. Cont. L.J. 685, 686–87 (2007); see also Major Patrick E. Tolan, 
Jr., Government Contracting with Small Business in the Wake of the Federal Acquisition Streamlining 
Act, the Federal Acquisition Reform Act, and Adarand: Small Business as Usual?, 44 A.F. L. Rev. 75, 
104 (1998). 
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procurement system to protect and promote small business interests.106 
Through the Small Business Act of 1953, Congress dedicated an entire 
agency—the SBA—to implementing and encouraging policies that “aid, 
counsel, assist, and protect . . . the interests of small-business concerns in order 
to preserve free competitive enterprise, to insure that a fair proportion of the 
total purchases and contracts or subcontracts for property and services for the 
[g]overnment. . . .”107 More importantly, Congress memorialized its support 
for small businesses by requiring agencies to meet small business contracting 
goals—targets designed to ensure that a fair proportion of federal contracts 
are issued to small businesses.108 Specifically, federal law requires agencies to 
meet a twenty-three percent small business contracting goal each year.109 To 
meet these goals, Contracting Officers (COs) are required to reserve a certain 
percentage of total contracts so only small businesses may bid on the oppor-
tunities.110 Typically, a CO must determine whether two or more small busi-
nesses exist offering proposals that do not exceed the market price, quality, 
and delivery.111 If the CO determines that this is the case, he or she must “set 
aside” the contract for small businesses.112 
In addition to prime contract set-asides, under certain circumstances, 
large prime contractors must also preference small businesses as their sub-
contractors.113 Specifically, under certain circumstances, prime contractors 
“must agree in the contract that small business, veteran-owned small business 
[(VOSB)], service-disabled veteran-owned small business [(SVOSB)], HUB-
Zone [Historically Utilized] small business, small disadvantaged business 
[(SDB)], and women-owned small business [(WOSB)] concerns will have the 
maximum practicable opportunity to participate in contract performance con-
sistent with its efficient performance.”114 
Defense contractors have enhanced small business obligations under the 
Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS).115 Further, the 
DoD is required to ensure that certain techniques such as “bundling,”116 which 
106. See Small Business Act of 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-163, § 202, 67 Stat. 232, 232 (1953); see 
also Mirit Eyal-Cohen, Why Is Small Business the Chief Business of Congress, 43 Rutgers L.J. 1, 3–4, 
30–31 (2011).
107. See 15 U.S.C. § 631(a)–(c) (2012).
108. See Arthur Selwyn Miller & W. Theodore Pierson, Jr., Observations on the Consistency of 
Federal Procurement Policies with Other Government Policies, 29 L. & Contemp. Probs. 277, 295–96 
(1964).
109. See Small Bus. Admin., Fiscal Year 2018 Small Business Procurement Scorecard 5 
(2018). 
110. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 644(g)(1), (j)(1). 
111. See FAR 19.502-2(a). 
112. See id. 
113. See FAR 19.702.
114. Id. 
115. See DFARS 219.502-2 (detailing mandatory set-asides for defense construction, dredg-
ing, and certain architect-engineer services).
116. Bundling means consolidating “two or more requirements for supplies or services, pre-
viously provided or performed under separate smaller contracts . . . into a solicitation for a single 
contract . . . that is likely to be unsuitable for award to a small business concern. . . .” FAR 2.101(b).
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may preclude small businesses from bidding on a particular contract, are min-
imized, or, when used, are supported by sufficient rationale.117 Thus, although 
there is a perception that the defense industry excludes small business con-
tractors from the market, in reality, the industry has an affirmative obligation 
to work with small firms. 
A. Impact of Small Business Compliance Failures on the Supply Chain
Because of the important role small businesses play in the procurement sys-
tem, their compliance failures can undermine the system’s integrity, create lia-
bility for their large-contractor partners, and result in their exclusion from the 
procurement system. Although the U.S. Government does not collect data on 
the number of small businesses excluded each year due to compliance failures, 
it is well-known in the industry that small business are more susceptible to 
debarment because of their limited knowledge of regulatory requirements and 
“less-developed compliance and ethics programs.”118 Moreover, when miscon-
duct is discovered, small businesses “often lack the resources to respond to and 
remediate harm….”119 When the U.S. Government has attempted to reverse 
this trend by proposing enhancements to small business compliance programs 
and internal controls, the government contracts industry has pushed back 
vehemently, arguing that the costs would be too burdensome for the small 
companies.120 
Small businesses have borne the brunt of the negative consequences of 
their compliance deficiencies, but those compliance deficiencies can also cre-
ate significant risk for the large, prime contractors that partner with small 
supplier firms.121 Thus, in an effort to minimize risks stemming from compli-
ance deficiencies in their supply chains, many sophisticated contractors would 
do well to dedicate significant resources to the monitoring and oversight of 
117. See DFARS 205.205-70(a) (requiring notice to be published when bundling is to be 
used); Acquisition Process: Task and Delivery Order Contracts, Bundling, Consolidation, 78 Fed. 
Reg. 61,114, 61,116 (Oct. 2, 2013) (to be codified at 13 C.F.R. pt. 121, 124, 125, 126 & 127) (find-
ing that new regulations are needed to ensure that small businesses as both prime and subcon-
tractors can be considered rather than excluded from multiple award contracts and acquisitions 
that are consolidated through bundling); U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., GAO-14-36, Small 
Business Contracting: Updated Guidance and Reporting Needed for Consolidated Con-
tracts 5–6 (2013); Matthew Weigelt, DOD Now Required to Report Bundled Contracts, Sole-Source 
Awards, Wash. Tech. (July 13, 2010), http://washingtontechnology.com/articles/2010/07/13 
/bundled-contract-sole-source-reporting.aspx [https://perma.cc/FVY2-XRP2]. 
118. See Dietrich Knauth, 5 Areas of Growing Debarment Risk for Contractors, Law 360 (Jan. 13, 
2014), https://www.crowell.com/files/5-Areas-Of-Growing-Debarment-Risk-For-Contractors.
pdf [https://perma.cc/UB3G-ULW5]. 
119. See A House of Cards Falls, supra note 9, at 56. 
120. See Federal Acquisition Regulation: FAR Case 2007–006: Contractor Business Ethics 
Compliance Program and Disclosure Requirements, 73 Fed. Reg. 67,064, 67,064, 67,084–85 
(Nov. 12, 2008) (to be codified at 48 C.F.R. pt. 2, 3, 9, 42 & 52). 
121. See PriceWaterhouseCoopers, How to Fortify Your Supply Chain Through Col-
laborative Risk Management 8, 12 (2009) (“A compliance failure at a supplier based anywhere 
in the world could become a major problem for a contractor.”).
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their subcontractors.122 Large contractors may also invest in ethics and com-
pliance training for some of their small subcontractors or suppliers to ensure 
that their business partners throughout the supply chain are aware of the 
extensive compliance obligations required under their subcontracts.123 Unfor-
tunately, oversight and training is not enough to prevent compliance fail-
ures—especially where subcontractors have failed to invest time or resources 
in developing their own compliance programs. This is source of great con-
cern for prime contractors, which could be held liable for the actions of their 
subcontractors.124 
Although large contractors continue to work with small businesses in order 
to meet statutory goals, it is rare that a large company’s commitment to small 
businesses extends beyond their minimum requirements.125 Indeed, many 
large corporations have typically “shied away from small suppliers because of 
the sense that they are untested, less reliable and more likely to go out of busi-
ness….”126 This not only undermines the government’s long-term strategic 
goals of enhancing opportunities for small businesses, it handicaps opportuni-
ties for large businesses to partner with new and potentially more innovative 
firms.
B. Sharing Compliance Best Practices 
The defense industry has made very visible commitments to elevating ethics 
and compliance in the industry. Many of the world’s largest defense contrac-
tors are establishing global ethics and compliance standards by participating 
in organizations and forums dedicated to these issues.127 For the past nine 
years, the aerospace and defense industries have held an annual conference 
attended by over eighty individuals from the industry, government enti-
ties, and non-governmental organizations in an effort to share compliance 
“best practices” and to “promote trust and integrity.”128 Further, the Defense 
Industry Initiative (DII)129 has fostered an annual forum of over 300 industry 
122. Cf. Contractor Business Ethics Compliance Program and Disclosure Requirements, 73 
Fed. Reg. at 67,069, 67,084 (discussing contractor resistance to mandatory subcontractor over-
sight and the government’s response). 
123. See Aaron Grieser, Defining the Outer Limits of Global Compliance Programs: Emerging 
Legal & Reputational Liability in Corporate Supply Chains, 10 Or. Rev. Int’l L. 285, 295, 303–04, 
311–12 (2008).
124. See id. at 301, 313, 315, 318. 
125. See Mark Foggin, Ctr. For Urban Future, Breaking into the Corporate Supply 
Chain 16 (2010) (discussing large contractors’ hesitancy to partner with small firms). 
126. Id. 
127. See, e.g., About DII, Def. Industry Initiative on Bus. Ethics & Conduct, https://www 
.dii.org/about/about-dii [https://perma.cc/35PT-362Y] (last visited Nov. 10, 2019) [hereinafter 
About DII]; What Is IFBEC?, Int’l F. on Bus. Ethical Conduct for Aerospace & Def. Industry, 
http://ifbec.info/about [https://perma.cc/F2Z9-TTLW] (last visited Nov. 11, 2019). 
128. Int’l Forum on Bus. Ethical Conduct for the Aerospace & Def. Indus., 5th Annual 
Conference Report 1 (2014) [hereinafter IFBEC Report].
129. The DII is a non-profit organization with “seventy-seven signatory companies com-
prising the top U.S. defense and security companies.” DGC International Continues to Support 
the Defense Industry Initiative, DGC Int’l (June 25, 2017), https://dgci.com/dgc-international 
-continues-to-support-the-defense-industry-initiative [https://perma.cc/P2CV-Z9HY]. The 
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professionals and government officials to share best practices and discuss cur-
rent issues related to ethics and compliance.130 DII has developed a “Model 
Supplier Code of Conduct” designed to establish the “expectations” the Initia-
tive holds for suppliers throughout the industry.131 It also serves as a resource 
for small and medium-sized contractors “seeking to streamline the processes 
by which they agreed to individual contractors’ codes of conduct when doing 
business with other DII members.”132 DII has also developed a “supplier tool-
kit” that is “designed to give SMEs the necessary guidance on creating effec-
tive ethics and compliance programs.”133 These examples make clear that the 
defense industry is actively collaborating with other industry leaders to share 
anti-corruption, ethics, and compliance best practices. 
Although these forums and public initiatives certainly convey a willing-
ness to share information about ethics and compliance practices, the specific 
details of company compliance programs are not always publicly available. A 
2012 Transparency International study found that almost half of the compa-
nies involved provided little or no evidence of basic anti-corruption systems, 
and two thirds provided inadequate levels of transparency in their systems.134 
By 2015, the same annual Transparency International study found some 
improvement—only about one quarter of companies provided absolutely no 
evidence of anti-corruption programs—but again found that two thirds still 
provided only limited evidence of their anti-corruption systems.135 Adding 
to these disclosure issues, these defense forums are closed events where only 
conference participants (typically industry members) are permitted to attend 
the discussions.136
The ongoing hesitancy to share this information publicly is understandable. 
Large contractors make significant investments in their ethics and compli-
ance programs, and some view their programs as proprietary and confidential. 
Many contractors fear that competitors will exploit this information if they 
share it publicly. Yet, by depriving small businesses access to this information 
organization seeks the continued promotion and advancement of a “culture of ethical conduct” in 
companies that provide products and services to the government. See About DII, supra note 127. 
130. See Membership Def. Industry Initiative on Bus. Ethics & Conduct, https://www.dii 
.org/membership [https://perma.cc/3LBS-A4X2] (last visited Oct. 11, 2019). 
131. See Def. Indus. Initiative on Bus. Ethics and Conduct, Model Supplier Code of 
Conduct 1–2 (2019). 
132. See IFBEC Report, supra note 129.
133. See id.
134. See Mark Pyman et al., Transparency International UK, Defence Companies 
Anti-Corruption Index 2012, at 4 (2012). 
135. See Katie Fish et al., Transparency International UK, Defence Companies 
Anti-Corruption Index 2015, at 4 (2015).
136. See, e.g., Member Connect, Def. Industry Initiative on Bus. Ethics & Conduct, 
https://connect.dii.org/home [https://perma.cc/MZ7X-E9TS] (stating that the forum is a 
“members-only community”). Although the DII forum is limited to industry members, the 
IFBEC has opened its annual conference to the general public. See International Forum on Busi-
ness Ethical Conduct (IFBEC) 2019 Annual Conference, Cvent, http://www.cvent.com/events 
/international-forum-on-business-ethical-conduct-ifbec-2019-annual-conference/event 
-summary-9e77b6e4cae74c04a820daca8045f6f6.aspx [https://perma.cc/AYC6-EARY] (last vis-
ited Nov. 11, 2019). 
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and resources, the large contractors may ultimately be harmed if the suppliers 
suffer from compliance deficiencies or failures. 
IV. INCENTIVIZING THE SHARING OF RESOURCES AND GUIDANCE
The entire supply chain benefits when contractors at all tiers view ethics and 
compliance as a critical component of their business. Although enhanced sup-
ply chain integrity may incentivize some large businesses to share compliance 
best practices with their suppliers, many large contractors continue to keep 
this information confidential.137 The defense industry is increasingly com-
mitted to sharing guidance and resources with small business and suppliers; 
however, the amount and type of information shared varies greatly among 
industry members.138 
Some large U.S. government contractors have invested resources into the 
ethics and compliance programs of their suppliers. For example, Lockheed 
Martin has created an “Ethics Supplier Mentoring Program,” which includes 
a suite of self-serve resources, the evaluation of a supplier’s existing ethics 
program, a live webinar series during which “Lockheed Martin Ethics staff 
walk participants through setup and implementation of each element of an 
effective [compliance] program,” and the option for one-on-one mentoring 
by a Lockheed Martin Ethics Officer.139 As of 2017, over fifty companies have 
participated in the program as mentees.140 
Lockheed’s effort to encourage the implementation of suppliers’ ethics and 
compliance programs reduces the risk of a compliance failure in the supply 
chain and enhances the overall integrity of the procurement system. If other 
large and sophisticated contractors were to invest resources into improv-
ing their suppliers’ ethics and compliance programs, it could strengthen the 
integrity of the U.S. government contracts regime. Unfortunately, not all 
contractors are willing to spend the time and resources necessary to men-
tor their suppliers on ethics and compliance best practices. It is clear that 
137. See Kroll 2015 Anti-Bribery and Corruption Benchmarking Report, supra note 102, 
at 6, 15. 
138. Compare Def. Indus. Initiative on Bus. Ethics and Conduct, Building and Maintain-
ing an Ethics and Compliance Program—The Small Business Toolkit 2 (2019) (explaining how 
the initiative’s toolkit can provide a solution to compliance challenges through training, the utili-
zation of sample codes of conduct, and self-audits), with Ethics Supplier Mentoring Program, Lock-
heed Martin, https://www.lockheedmartin.com/content/dam/lockheed-martin/eo/documents 
/ethics/ethics-supplier-mentoring-program-overview.pdf [https://perma.cc/N99L-F6PS] (last 
visited Nov. 11, 2019) [hereinafter Lockheed 1] (differing from DII’s toolkit by explaining that the 
important elements of Lockheed’s compliance program include self-assessment, working with an 
ethics officer, and learning how to build a compliance program via webinar instruction).
139. See Lockheed 1, supra note 138; see also Ethics, Lockheed Martin, https://www.lock 
heedmartin.com/en-us/suppliers/supplier-ethics.html [https://perma.cc/2ZAB-BEHC] (last vis-
ited Nov. 10, 2019) [hereinafter Lockheed 2]. 
140. See Ethics Supplier Mentoring Program: Participants in One-on-One Mentoring Program, Lock-
heed Martin, https://www.lockheedmartin.com/content/dam/lockheed-martin/eo/documents 
/ethics/supplier-ethics-mentees-list.pdf [https://perma.cc/4EVV-2WCJ] (last visited Nov. 11, 
2019).
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additional incentives are necessary to foster increased information sharing 
among the companies. Fortunately, a template for incentivized information 
sharing already exists in the U.S. procurement system: the “mentor-protégé 
program.” If implemented in the ethics and compliance context, this model 
could provide lasting benefits to the entire procurement system.
A. The Model: Federal Mentor Protégé Programs
In 1991, the mentor-protégé assistance programs were created to provide small 
businesses with resources and support in the federal procurement sector.141 
A mentor-protégé program is an arrangement in which mentors—businesses, typ-
ically experienced prime contractors—provide technical, managerial, and other 
business development assistance to eligible small businesses, or protégés. In return, 
the programs provide incentives for mentor participation, such as credit toward 
subcontracting goals, additional evaluation points toward the awarding of contracts, 
an annual award to the mentor providing the most effective developmental support 
to a protégé and in some cases, cost reimbursement. 142
Ideally, mentors and protégés work in conjunction to create a “develop-
mental assistance” agreement.143 The purpose of this agreement is to ensure 
that the large business trains the smaller business on industry specific sub-
jects,144 provides assistance in obtaining government and commercial con-
tracts, advises on issues related to contract administration, and guides the 
smaller company on general business and organizational management skills.145 
Through these initiatives, the U.S. Government hopes to develop and pro-
duce businesses that are able to function independently in the federal con-
tracting system.146 
Since the mentor-protégé program depends on the willingness of experi-
enced and sophisticated contractors to serve as mentors to smaller companies, 
the government incentivizes large businesses to participate in the program.147 
These incentives are typically financial and contractual advantages that 
may be used to obtain or enhance procurement opportunities.148 This may 
include credit149 towards a prime contractor’s mandatory subcontracting goals, 
141. See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., GAO/NSAID-94-101, Defense Contract-
ing: Implementation of the Pilot Mentor-Protege Program 1 (1994) [hereinafter GAO 
/NSIAD-94-101].
142. U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., GAO-11-548R, Mentor-Protégé Programs Have 
Policies That Aim to Benefit Participants but Do Not Require Postagreement Tracking 1 
(2011) [hereinafter GAO-11-548R]. 
143. See id. at 3.
144. These subjects include “production, quality control, manufacturing, engineering, and 
computer hardware and software.” See id. 
145. See GAO/NSIAD-94-101, supra note 141, at 1–2. 
146. See Keir X. Bancroft, Regulating Information Security in the Government Contracting Indus-
try: Will the Rising Tide Lift All the Boats?, 62 Am. U. L. Rev. 1145, 1194–95 (2013).
147. See GAO-11-548R, supra note 142, at 1.
148. See id.
149. A credit allows prime contractors to count costs incurred during mentorship as if 
they were incurred in a subcontract awarded to their protégé. See Nat’l Women’s Bus. Coun-
cil, Evaluating Federal Mentor-Protégé Programs: Assessment, Case Studies and 
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additional evaluation points that increase a prime contractor’s likelihood of 
winning a contract, or an annual monetary award to mentors that prove their 
support has benefitted the protégé.150 
Certain agencies may provide additional incentives. For example, the DoD 
allows prime contractor mentors to collect reimbursements for certain costs 
incurred while mentoring their protégés.151 The U.S. Department of Energy 
(DoE), the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), and the National Aero-
nautics and Space Administration (NASA) provide prime contractors with 
award fees152 that recognize successful mentor protégé developments.153 Addi-
tionally, the SBA’s program permits large companies to work on contracts that 
are specifically set aside for small businesses if they serve as a mentor to the 
small business in the contract.154 These incentives are designed to sweeten 
the deal for large companies assisting small businesses by providing prime 
contractors with opportunities normally barred by other federal contracting 
policies.155 When the arrangements are executed properly, “[mentors benefit] 
from a strengthened cadre of subcontractors and [the agency benefits] from a 
resultant robust and competitive supplier base.”156 
B. The Compliance Mentorship Program
The existing mentor-protégé program template could meaningfully narrow 
the compliance gap that currently plagues the procurement system. This 
model of information sharing in exchange for financial and contractual incen-
tives is a proven concept that could be implemented in the compliance con-
text with modest effort and resources. The application of this program in the 
ethics and compliance setting could encourage the sharing of expertise and 
resources by large contractors with their small, less sophisticated counterparts. 
The mentor-protégé template could benefit both small and large compa-
nies for several reasons. First, the protégé will benefit from the compliance 
guidance and resources shared by the mentor. By sharing resources and offer-
ing guidance, the mentor can elevate the protégé’s ethics and compliance pro-
gram to better reflect industry best practices. The partnership will also help 
Recommendations 7, 9–10 (2011). This credit enables large contractors to meet their subcon-
tracting goals. See id. 
150. See id. at 7–9. 
151. See DFARS I-109(d) (permitting mentors to seek reimbursement of up to $1,000,000 for 
costs associated with assistance provided to a protégé firm each fiscal year).
152. An award fee is a monetary bonus for costs that are saved or for good performance and is 
used to motivate contractors to provide satisfactory and efficient performance. See FAR 16.401(a), 
(e)(2) (describing incentive contracts and guidelines for award fees). 
153. See DEAR 919.7006(a); NFS 1819.7201(b); VAAR 819.7105(d).
154. See 13 C.F.R. § 124.513(a)–(b) (2019) (granting an SBA mentor and protégé relationship 
the authority to enter into a joint venture as a small business for a government prime contract or 
subcontract opportunity, including those set aside for companies who meet certain small business 
size standards). 
155. See Cong. Research Serv., R41722, Small Business Mentor-Protégé Programs 7–8 
(Jan. 7, 2019). 
156. See U.S Gov’t. Accountability Off., GAO-01-767, Contract Management: Bene-
fits of the DOD Mentor-Protégé Program Are Not Conclusive 3 (2001).
PCLJ_49-2.indd   238 2/27/20   12:52 PM
239The Compliance Mentorship Program
the protégé self-identify potential areas of corruption risk, which will benefit 
the entire supply chain.
Although specific ethics and compliance goals would be established at the 
outset of the program, mentors would be expected to help the protégé do the 
following: (1) design a compliance program tailored to the protégé’s specific 
size, industry, and risk profile; (2) develop a comprehensive and effective train-
ing program; and (3) draft tailored policies and procedures. Mentors would 
also be expected to share resources and guidance on an ongoing basis, thus 
eventually enabling the protégé to maintain an effective, internal compliance 
program.157 
Although the small contractors would undoubtedly benefit from this pro-
gram, mentors would also be rewarded for the time and energy spent guid-
ing protégé firms. In addition to the incentives inherent in reducing supply 
chain risk, the program would provide mentors with significant financial 
and contractual incentives, such as award fees and access to certain set-aside 
contracts.158 Large companies would benefit from additional contracting 
opportunities while simultaneously promoting a more ethical and compliant 
procurement process. Large companies in particular could benefit given the 
significant resources they already allocate to compliance functions: the costs 
of sharing best practices would be minimal and the financial incentives and 
enhanced market access could be quite lucrative.
Developments in the defense industry suggest that this approach could be 
embraced as a positive movement towards a more collaborative and transpar-
ent system. Organizations such as the DII and the International Forum on 
Business Ethical Conduct (IFBEC) provide resources to small businesses to 
encourage ethics and compliance, such as model supplier codes of conduct and 
information on how to implement an effective ethics program.159 Moreover, 
as previously noted, Lockheed Martin offers ethics and compliance resources 
and optional mentoring to its suppliers in order to ensure best practices are 
implemented throughout their supply chains.160 
Significant strides could be made if large contractors regularly mentored 
small contractors to help them enhance their ethics and compliance programs. 
Mentoring could include: (1) comprehensive reviews of the small business’ 
existing ethics and compliance programs; (2) recommendations for improve-
ments; (3) assistance implementing compliance enhancements; (4) providing 
157. To reduce any potential concerns mentor firms may have regarding liability for a protégé 
firm’s actions, the mentor-protégé agreement (which will be approved by the government) should 
contain language making clear that neither party will be liable to the other for damages aris-
ing out of or relating to the development of the ethics compliance program in the context of 
the mentor-protégé relationship. Moreover, the agreement should also contain a standard men-
tor-protégé indemnification clause, designed to cover actions taken pursuant to the agreement.
158. See supra text accompanying notes 154–57. 
159. See Featured Tools, Def. Industry Initiative on Bus. Ethics & Conduct, https://
www.dii.org/featured-tools [https://perma.cc/68U5-HQMP] (last visited Oct, 18, 2019); see also 
Resources, Int’l F. on Bus. Ethical Conduct for Aerospace & Def. Industry, https://ifbec.info 
/resources [https://perma.cc/P878-3BR6] (last visited Oct. 7, 2019).
160. See Lockheed 2, supra note 139. 
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training to the protégé firms; (5) assistance evaluating and testing the pro-
grams; and (6) ongoing mentorship from the large companies’ experienced 
ethics and compliance staff. 
Of course, to maximize the proposed program’s effectiveness, the govern-
ment would need to dedicate resources to ensure that mentor firms provide 
sufficient guidance and assistance to protégés. It is also critical that mentors 
are properly screened to ensure they are joining the program to further the 
program’s policy goals—not to exploit incentives at the expense of protégé 
firms. Although no government program is immune from abuse, safeguards 
like these will prevent and deter potential program manipulation.161 
Fortunately, lessons can be drawn from audits of the existing mentor- 
protégé program. A 2007 audit of the DoD’s mentor-protégé program found 
that some mentor firms benefited from the program’s procurement and finan-
cial incentives, but failed to provide adequate procurement guidance to their 
protégés.162 Dissatisfied protégé firms have pointed to a “lack of mentor commit-
ment to the program, mentor failure to meet the objectives of mentor-protégé 
agreements, and costs to the protégés that exceeded the return from partic-
ipation.”163 Although some concerns with the mentor-protégé program do 
exist, the audit found that the DoD’s mentor-protégé program enhanced the 
overall capabilities of ninety-three percent of the forty-eight protégés that 
were involved in the program and participated in the audit survey.164 Similarly, 
GAO conducted an audit in 2017 of the DoD’s pilot mentor-protégé program 
and found that while the program assisted participants during their partici-
pation, it was difficult to measure and track the effectiveness of the protégés 
when they left the program.165 GAO determined that the DoD required addi-
tional measures to develop more concrete goals and indicators of program 
161. The SBA recently published proposed regulations, issued in November 2019, that 
respond to some of the criticisms of the Mentor-Protégé Program found in recent GAO and SBA 
audit reports. SBA has made clear in the proposed regulations that its focus is the protégé firm and 
the “business development assistance a proposed mentor can provide to a protégé to enable that 
firm to more effectively compete on its own in the future.” See Consolidation of Mentor-Protégé 
Programs and Other Government Contracting Amendments, 84 Fed. Reg. 60,846, 60,859 (Nov. 
8, 2019) (to be codified at 13 C.F.R. pt. 121, 124, 125, 126, 127 & 134).
162. See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., GAO-07-151, Contract Management: 
Protégés Value DOD’s Mentor Protégé Program, but Annual Reporting to Congress 
Needs Improvement 4, 7 (2007) [hereinafter GAO-07-151]. A 2011 audit by the U.S. Govern-
ment Accountability Office also found that it was difficult to determine mentor-protégé program 
success because there was not enough annual reporting by federal agencies regarding protégés’ 
progress after the conclusion of the mentor-protégé program. See GAO-11-548R, supra note 142, 
at 2, 7. The report found that ten of the thirteen agencies with mentor-protégé programs were 
not able to provide this kind of post-agreement analysis, which GAO determined could further 
assist agencies in modifying programs to better improve the protégés experience. See id. at 7–9.
163. See GAO-07-151, supra note 162, at 7. But see GAO-11-548R, supra note 142, at 6 (not-
ing that dissatisfied protégés may report dissatisfaction with mentors and suggesting that such 
reporting rarely occurs). 
164. See GAO-07-151, supra note 162, at 6. See generally GAO-11-548R, supra note 142, at 7 
(discussing DoD successes with its mentor-protégé program in 2008 and 2009). 
165. See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office Report, GAO 17-172, Small Business Con-
tracting: DOD Should Take Actions to Ensure That Its Pilot Mentor-Protégé Program 
Enhances the Capabilities of Protégé Firms 15–17 (2017).
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effectiveness during the protégé’s participation.166 The lessons learned from 
past experiences in the mentor-protégé program, coupled with contempo-
rary developments in industry ethics and compliance mentoring programs, 
demonstrate that this model could be extremely beneficial in the ethics and 
compliance setting, so long as sufficient safeguards are put in place.167 Not 
only would front-end screening of prospective participants be an essential 
component of the program, the government would need to install a back-end 
verification process to ensure all parties have maintained their commitments. 
With screening and oversight mechanisms in place, the impact of this pro-
gram on small business compliance programs could be significant. 
V. CONCLUSION
A “compliance mentorship program” could successfully foster the develop-
ment of small business ethics and compliance programs. With appropriate 
safeguards in place, the potential improvements to the overall integrity of the 
procurement system could be significant. The program could greatly reduce 
supply chain risks and enhance the overall ethics and compliance practices of a 
chronically weak segment of the procurement system. By incentivizing ethics 
and compliance at all levels of the supply chain, a “compliance mentorship 
program” could substantially enhance the U.S. procurement system by ensur-
ing that the government’s business partners, large and small, are responsible, 
ethical, and compliant. 
166. Cf. id. at 23 (recommending that the DoD develop improved systems to collect infor-
mation from mentors on how the program enhances capabilities of protégées and noting that the 
DoD has already agreed to comply). 
167. See generally GAO-07-151, supra note 162, at 6–7 (discussing the relative success of the 
DoD’s mentor-protégé program but also noting some dissatisfaction among protégés); see gener-
ally GAO-11-548R, supra note 142, at 6 (discussing mechanisms such as reporting requirements, 
reviews, and recourse for dissatisfaction used in mentor-protégé programs that could be beneficial 
to compliance programs).
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